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The use of equity incentives is significantly greater in countries with stronger insider trading 
restrictions, and these higher incentives are associated with higher total pay.  These findings 
are robust to alternative definitions of insider trading restrictions and enforcement, and to 
panel regressions with country fixed effects.  We also find significant increases in top 
executive pay and the use of equity-based incentives in the period immediately following the 
initial enforcement of insider trading laws.  We conclude that insider trading laws are one 
channel through which cross-country differences in pay practices can be explained.  
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Recent studies document substantial cross-country variation in both the level of executive 
compensation and the use of equity-based incentives for top executives [see, e.g., Murphy 
(1999), Murphy (2012)].  However, the underlying factors contributing to these observed 
differences remain the topic of active investigation.  For example, although Conyon, Core, and 
Guay (2011) find that higher levels of pay for U.S. CEOs relative to their U.K. and E.U. 
counterparts can be explained (at least in part) by their higher stock and option incentives, their 
findings leave open the question of why incentives are so much higher for U.S. CEOs.  Indeed, 
Conyon et al. suggest that “researchers should shift their efforts toward better understanding the 
reason for differences in incentives between CEOs in the U.S. and CEOs in the U.K. and other 
parts of the world.” 
We analyze whether country-level restrictions in insider trading contribute to cross-
country differences in top executive compensation.  Specifically, we analyze several (not 
mutually exclusive) channels through which compensation and insider trading restrictions might 
be related.  One possibility is that insider trading represents a form of compensation for top 
executives.  Thus, when insider trading laws are restrictive, equilibrium in the labor market 
forces firms to increase the level of top executive compensation.  A second possibility is that the 
strength of insider trading laws affects the optimal use of equity incentives.  If insider trading 
represents a form of equity incentives [e.g., Manne (1966)], restricting such trading might lead 
firms to substitute other types of equity incentives in the executive compensation contract.  
Similarly, when insider trading laws are weaker, firms might choose to use relatively fewer 
incentives in pay packages so as to avoid trading-related agency conflicts [see, for example, 
2 
Baiman and Verrecchia (1995)].  Because greater equity incentives expose top executives to 
greater risk, the increased use of equity incentives when insider trading is restricted also leads to 
higher levels of compensation.  A third possibility is that insider trading laws are themselves a 
response to cross-country differences in pay practices.  Specifically, in countries in which firms 
use greater equity incentives, stronger insider trading laws are required to mitigate trading-
related agency conflicts with executives.   
To provide evidence on these hypotheses, we analyze both levels of top executive 
compensation and the use of equity-based incentives for a broad set of executives in 41 different 
countries.  Our primary sample consists of 468 non-U.S. firms with American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs) and 1,852 U.S. firms in 2006.  The primary virtue of analyzing compensation 
in foreign firms with ADRs is that such firms are required to file Form 20-F with the SEC.  Thus, 
we are able to obtain complete, standardized compensation data at the firm level for all of our 
sample firms.  By contrast, most prior cross-country compensation studies have been forced to 
rely upon survey-based and country-aggregate compensation data.1  We recognize that a possible 
limitation of our data is that firms with ADRs are not representative of the population of firms in 
that country and later address this potential limitation.   
We measure insider trading restrictions in two ways.  First, following Du and Wei 
(2004), we use an insider trading restriction (ITR) index that is based on global executive 
opinion surveys about the extent of insider trading restrictions in individual countries.  Second, 
we use an insider trading law (ITL) index from Beny (2006) that captures differences in the 
strength of insider trading laws.  Importantly, for our purposes, both ITR and ITL exhibit 
substantial cross-country variation.   
                                                          
1 Examples include Abowd and Bognanno (1995), Abowd and Kaplan (1999), and Murphy (1999) who rely on 
Towers Perrin’s Worldwide Total Remuneration reports. 
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Our baseline analysis indicates that equity incentives are positively related to insider 
trading restrictions.  These findings are robust to the inclusion of a variety of firm-level and 
country-level control variables, such as firm size, leverage, R&D, growth opportunities, board 
structure, shareholder protection, and country GDP.  Moreover, the implied impact of insider 
trading restrictions on equity incentives is also economically important.  A one unit increase in 
the ITR index (approximately one standard deviation) is associated with an increase in overall 
equity incentives of over 200%, and an increase in the percentage of equity-based pay (i.e., the 
incremental flow of incentives) of about twenty-two percentage points.  We also find that the 
level of top executive total pay is positively associated with insider trading restrictions.  
However, we cannot reject that this finding is driven by the greater use of equity incentives (and, 
therefore, higher risk premium) in countries with stronger insider trading restrictions.   
These baseline findings are consistent with all three hypothesized channels for the 
association between insider trading restrictions and compensation.  In addition, a fourth 
possibility is that there is no causal connection between insider trading restrictions and top 
executive pay/incentives.  Under this explanation, the association between the two is a spurious 
byproduct of the fact that our regressions omit potentially important factors that are correlated 
with both insider trading restrictions and executive pay.  
To further discriminate among these alternative explanations, therefore, we conduct 
several additional tests.  First, we exploit time-series variation in insider trading restrictions to 
estimate panel regressions with country and year fixed effects.  The results from these tests 
indicate that greater restrictions on insider trading are associated with significant increases in the 
use of incentive compensation. 
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Second, we analyze changes in compensation around the dates of initial enforcement of 
insider trading laws.  After controlling for time trends and fixed country effects, we find that 
both the level of total executive compensation and the use of equity-based incentives increase 
significantly following the initial enforcement of insider trading laws.   
Third, we analyze whether the observed link between executive compensation and insider 
trading restrictions is associated with the level of insider ownership.  Because higher insider 
ownership diminishes the need for additional incentives at the margin, this should weaken the 
link between insider trading restrictions and the use of equity incentives if the direction of 
causation runs from trading restrictions to executive pay.  Consistent with this argument, the 
results from these tests indicate that higher inside ownership weakens the link between insider 
trading restrictions and both overall equity incentives and the level of pay.   
Based on the results of these additional tests, we conclude that the evidence appears most 
consistent with a causal link that runs from insider trading restrictions to compensation 
incentives.  Such a link is consistent with both (i) insider trading serving as an implicit form of 
compensation, and (ii) firms optimally choosing to use greater (fewer) equity incentives when 
insider trading restrictions are strong (weak).  Because (i) depends on insider trading restrictions 
leading to reduced trading profits for executives whereas (ii) does not, distinguishing between 
these two explanations requires observation of whether stronger insider trading restrictions 
actually do reduce executive trading profits.   
Unfortunately, we are unaware of systematic data on the profitability of insider trading 
outside of the U.S.  Therefore, we conduct an indirect test by analyzing the run-up in stock prices 
prior to acquisition announcements in each of our sample countries.  Prior studies document both 
the existence of abnormal insider trading by executives prior to takeover announcements 
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[Agrawal and Nasser (2012)] and an association between pre-announcement run-ups and 
informed trading [Arshadi and Eyssell (1991)].  We thus test whether cross-country differences 
in stock price run-ups are associated with the strength of insider trading laws.  Consistent with 
reduced informed trading in countries with tighter restrictions on insider trading, we find a 
significant negative association between pre-acquisition stock price run-ups and the strength of 
insider trading restrictions.  However, we note an important caveat with interpreting this finding 
as evidence of reduced insider profits for executives in countries with stronger insider trading 
restrictions.  Although the study by Arshadi and Eyssell (1991) finds that there is a reduction in 
net insider purchases prior to tender offer announcements after the passage of a new insider 
trading law in the U.S., they report that the largest effect is on trading by beneficial owners of the 
target’s shares.  Thus, our finding of lower run-ups in countries with stronger insider trading 
restrictions can be viewed as evidence of reduced trading profits for executives only if the trades 
of those executives are correlated with those of other beneficial owners.  Unfortunately, we lack 
direct evidence on that issue.   
By identifying insider trading restrictions as an important channel through which 
differences in cross-country compensation and incentives can be explained, our findings 
contribute to the growing international executive compensation literature.2  Our findings also 
complement and extend those of Roulstone (2003), who finds that self-imposed insider trading 
restrictions in U.S. firms are related to higher executive compensation and a greater level of 
incentive compensation.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we provide background 
on the literature that hypothesizes a link between insider trading and compensation.  Section 3 
                                                          
2 See also Abowd and Bognanno (1995), Conyon and Schwalbach (1997), and Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and 
Murphy (2012).   
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describes our sample selection process and describes our primary data.  Section 4 reports the 
results of our cross-sectional regressions.  In Section 5, we report the results from a series of 
additional tests that explore alternative explanations for our findings. Section 6 reports the results 
from our analysis of stock price run-ups prior to acquisition announcements and Section 7 
concludes.   
 
2. Insider Trading, Equity Incentives and Top Executive Compensation  
 In this section, we discuss several channels through which insider trading restrictions 
might be associated with compensation levels and equity incentives.  These channels differ in the 
extent to which they rely on a substitution between insider trading profits and compensation, and 
the direction of causation in the hypothesized association between insider trading restrictions and 
compensation. 
 
2.1. Compensation and insider trading profits as substitutes 
A large body of academic literature reports that insider trading allows insiders to 
profitably exploit their private information and realize significant trading profits. 3   Several 
studies point to such trading profits as providing a potential link between insider trading 
restrictions and compensation policies.  In Baiman and Verrecchia (1995, 1996), managers can 
trade profitably based on their private information, but shareholders compute the expected 
amount of this redistribution from traders and deduct it from explicit managerial pay.  If 
equilibrium wages are determined competitively and the level of compensation is measured as 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Damodaran and Liu (2003), Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006), Meulbroek (1992), and 
Seyhun (1986).   
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the sum of explicit compensation and insider trading profits, these models predict a positive 
association between insider trading restrictions and equilibrium compensation levels.4 
Other studies point towards insider trading profits as a substitute source of equity 
incentives.  For example, both Carlton and Fischel (1983) and Manne (1966) hypothesize that 
because insider trading allows insiders to profit from their innovation and effort, it represents a 
means for providing incentives to top executives.  Moreover, Carlton and Fischel (1983) argue 
that allowing insider trading is more efficient than ex post salary renegotiations of the type in 
Fama (1980) because it avoids frequent and costly renegotiations.  Thus, if insider trading is 
restricted, firms need to make greater use of other forms of incentive compensation in order to 
maintain optimal incentive levels.  The greater use of incentives in turn, leads to higher levels of 
compensation as executives are compensated for bearing greater risk. 
 Although the above arguments suggest that restrictions on insider trading will lead firms 
to substitute into other forms of equity incentives, critics argue that insider trading can create 
perverse incentives as well.  For example, several studies point out that because insider trading 
allows executives to profit from bad news as well as good news, managers may be less willing to 
exert effort to increase firm value, and may even take actions that create unfavorable news.5  
This argument suggests that when insider trading is allowed, firms should make greater use of 




                                                          
4 A similar argument is also made by Khanna, Slezak and Bradley (1994).  
5 See, for example, Bagnoli and Khanna (1992), Levmore (1992), and Schotland (1967).  Carlton and Fischel (1983) 
contend that these adverse incentive effects of insider trading are of second-order importance because of limits on 
short-selling as well as reputation and litigation concerns.   
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2.2. Insider trading restrictions and the optimal use of incentives 
 The predictions outlined above rely on a substitution between executive trading profits 
and top executive compensation.  Similar predictions can be obtained, however, even if there is 
no such substitution.  For example, Baiman and Verrecchia (1995) model two types of agency 
problems related to informed trading by managers in their own shares.  In the first, the ability of 
managers to trade in their own shares weakens the link between compensation paid by 
shareholders and the consumption of managers.  This reduces shareholder control over the 
manager’s effort decision thereby diminishing the usefulness of equity incentives.  In the second, 
managers trading in their own shares can affect the market price of those shares and, 
consequently, their level of compensation.  Shareholders will optimally account for this potential 
for manipulation by lowering the weight on stock price in the manager’s compensation contract.6   
Thus, even if there is no substitution between insider trading profits and explicit 
compensation, these arguments predict a positive association between country-level insider 
trading restrictions and equity incentives.  Again, executives of firms using greater equity 
incentives will require higher levels of total pay as compensation for bearing greater incentive 
risk.  These arguments therefore also predict a positive association between country-level insider 
trading restrictions and the level of compensation.   
 
2.3. Insider trading laws as an endogenous response to country pay practices 
 Although the above hypotheses predict a causal association that runs from insider trading 
restrictions to equilibrium compensation incentives, it is possible that the direction of causation 
                                                          
6  Note that alternatively, shareholders could impose their own restrictions on executive trading through more 
stringent vesting requirements, as well as restrictions on option exercises and stock sales.  Thus, this hypothesis 
implicitly assumes that the costs of imposing and enforcing such firm-specific restrictions exceed the benefits of 
doing so.   
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is reversed.  That is, country-level insider trading laws themselves might be an endogenous 
response to typical pay practices within that country.  For example, in countries that make 
greater use of equity incentives in compensation plans, regulators might set tighter insider 
trading restrictions to mitigate trading-related agency conflicts of the type described in Baiman 
and Verrecchia (1995, 1996).  Again, compensation levels will necessarily be higher in these 
countries to compensate executives for bearing greater incentive risk.   
 
2.4. Related evidence 
There are thus several plausible reasons to expect a positive association between country-
level insider trading restrictions and both compensation levels and the use of incentives.  The 
existence of such an association and its underlying reasons are empirical issues that our study 
addresses.  To date, the literature provides only limited, indirect evidence.  Roulstone (2003) 
studies the link between compensation and self-imposed insider trading restrictions.  He finds 
that firms with such restrictions exhibit higher levels of compensation and make greater use of 
incentive compensation.  Although Roulstone interprets these findings as consistent with the 
view that insider trading plays a role in rewarding and motivating employees, it is difficult to 
rule out the possibility of a correlated omitted variable.  Moreover, because Roulstone (2003) 
analyzes insider trading restrictions and compensation in just one country, the U.S., his study 
does not address whether cross-country differences in compensation practices are associated with 
country-level restrictions on insider trading.  Our study aims to fill this gap by providing direct 
evidence on the association between insider trading restrictions and executive compensation in a 
cross-country setting.7   
                                                          
7 Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) also suggest that the analysis of international data could be useful for addressing 
whether higher levels of executive compensation in the U.S. is related to differences in insider trading: “The greater 
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3. Sample Selection and Data Description 
In this section, we describe the executive compensation data that we use in our empirical 
analysis as well as our primary measures of insider trading restrictions.  We then report summary 
statistics for the sample.   
 
3.1. Executive Compensation Data 
Foreign companies issuing ADRs in the U.S. markets are required to file Form 20-F 
reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  This form contains information on 
the board of directors, the compensation of executives and directors, the location of the business, 
the company’s industry sector, and other miscellaneous items.8  From the 20-F reports, we 
collect compensation data for the top executives of all foreign firms issuing ADRs.  
Compensation data for executives of U.S. firms is obtained from ExecuComp. 
We begin with a list of all Level 2 and Level 3 ADRs as of May 2008 from the JPMorgan 
ADR Group website.  We then supplement this set of firms by examining the list of all ADRs 
from 1961 to 2007 downloaded from CRSP.  We exclude Level 1 and Rule 144A ADRs because 
they are either traded over the counter or are private placements, making them exempt from SEC 
reporting requirements.  For the resulting set of ADRs, we search SEC’s EDGAR database for 
20-F filings in 2006.  If a sample firm does not have a 20-F filing in 2006, we obtain the relevant 
data from either its 2005 or 2007 filing, where available.  
There is some variation in the level of detail with which executive compensation data is 
available.  In some filings, information on compensation of individual executives (typically the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
diffuseness of U.S. capital markets and the consequent less profitable opportunities for insider trading by managers 
may provide a partial explanation for the observed higher level of direct compensation received by U.S. CEOs.” (p. 
2-3). 
8 See Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) for a detailed description of this source of compensation data. 
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most highly-paid executives) can be obtained from summary executive compensation tables.  We 
later refer to these firms as U.S. style reporting firms.  In other cases, the compensation tables 
report only the aggregate compensation for all executives (and directors).  For each firm, we 
construct firm-level compensation variables that capture the level and structure of compensation 
for the average executive in that firm.  Whenever available, we use the individual executive-level 
data to construct our firm-level measures.  Otherwise, we use the aggregate firm-level data to 
construct average values per top executive.   
The compensation data contain various components: salary, bonus, equity-based 
compensation such as restricted stock awards and option grants, and other compensation such as 
pensions and perquisites.  Our analysis focuses primarily on the dollar amount of total 
compensation (Total Pay) and a measure of overall equity incentives (Equity Incentives).  Total 
Pay is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, equity incentive compensation (including restricted 
stock awards and option grants) and other compensation.9  When stated in local currencies, Total 
Pay is converted into U.S. dollars using year-average exchange rates in corresponding data years 
as the conversion rate.  In addition, all Total Pay figures are converted into 2006 real dollars by 
adjusting for the inflation rate between 2006 and the given year.  Equity Incentives are measured 
as the overall sensitivity of executive wealth to a 1% change in the firm’s stock price.  Because 
this measure requires data at the individual executive level, tests using this measure are 
conducted on the subset of firms with U.S. style reporting.  Nonetheless, because we do not have 
complete data on the details of outstanding options (e.g., maturity, exercise price, etc.), these 
sensitivities are estimated based on fully diluted shares outstanding; i.e., assuming that all 
outstanding options are exercised.  Finally, in some tests, we use a measure of the incremental 
                                                          
9 For both restricted stock awards and option grants, we use the grant’s market value at the time of the award.  The 
grant date fair value of options granted is used in the calculation, which is largely made available in the 20-F, 
following the International Financial Reporting Standards 2 (IFRS2). 
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flow of incentives (Equity Pay Ratio) -  defined as the fraction of total compensation that is 
comprised of equity-based incentive pay, where equity-based incentive pay is measured as the 
total grant-date value of restricted stock awards and option grants.  The definitions for these and 
other variables can be found in Appendix A. 
A possible concern with our sample is that, because the ADR firms are listed in the U.S., 
the insider trading restrictions that apply to them are different from those that apply to the 
general population of firms in their home country.  For example, perhaps by listing in the U.S., 
ADR firms are subject to U.S. insider trading regulation.  However, because of the SEC’s long-
standing policy goal of facilitating access of foreign issuers to U.S. capital markets, ADR firms 
are provided with a variety of exemptions to U.S. insider trading rules.  For example, the 
Exchange Act Rule 3a12-3(b)10 exempts foreign private issuers from the Commission’s proxy 
rules11, and from the insider stock trading reports and short-swing profit recovery provisions 
under Section 1612 of the Exchange Act.13  Regulation FD, which limits private communications 
of material information, also exempts foreign private issuers from its coverage. 14   Foreign 
private issuers would be subject to the pension blackout trading restriction (Regulation BTR), a 
clarification to Section 306(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, but only under a certain 
condition.15  Thus, ADR firms are not subject to the same level of insider trading regulation as 
                                                          
10 Also referred to as 17 CFR 240.3a12-3(b). 
 
11 17 CFR 240.14a-1 et seq. 
 
12 15 U.S.C. 78p. 
 
13 See, for example, Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, RIN 
3235-AI62, Final Rule, Securities and Exchange Commission, footnote 12. Alternatively, see Foreign Issuer 
Reporting Enhancements, RIN 3235-AK03, Final Rule, Securities and Exchange Commission, footnote 37.  
 
14 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, RIN 3235-AH82, Final Rule, Securities and Exchange Commission.  
 
15 Insider Trades During Pension Fund Blackout Periods, RIN 3235-AI71, Final Rule, Securities and Exchange 
Commission. According to the rule, foreign private issuers are only subject to Reg BTR if the blackout were to 
13 
U.S. firms.  Moreover, because the majority of ADR firms are also listed on their domestic 
exchange, they are required to follow domestic insider trading laws.  Finally, even if ADR firms 
are affected primarily by U.S. insider law and enforcement, this will bias our tests against finding 
any association between compensation and our measures of insider trading restrictions.   
A related concern is that because ADR firms tend to be larger and more profitable than 
the typical firm in their home country, our findings are subject to a sample selection bias.  It is 
important to point out, however, that any such selection bias applies to all of the countries that 
make up our sample.  Thus, it is unlikely to bias our estimates of the cross-sectional association 
between compensation and insider trading restrictions.   
Nonetheless, to provide further evidence on this issue, we compare our data with the 
summary compensation data from Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy (2012).  For the 
twenty-three countries that are common to both studies, our compensation measures, Total Pay 
and Equity Pay Ratio, both have correlation coefficients of around 0.55 (significant at the 1% 
level) with similar measures in Fernandes et al. (2012).  These high correlations imply that, 
despite potential differences between ADR firms and their local counterparts, the cross-sectional 
variation in pay practices among ADR firms is similar to that among local firms.  Moreover, 
within the empirical analyses, we control for firm characteristics such as firm size, profitability, 
market-to-book ratio, financial leverage, board size and board independence to account for 
differences in these characteristics across firms.  Finally, in addition to the ADR compensation 
data, we later report robustness tests that utilize alternative data sources.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
affect at least 50% of the pension plan beneficiaries located within the U. S. and such persons represented more than 
15% of all participants and beneficiaries under all individual account plans of the issuer. 
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3.2. Insider Trading Measures 
Our primary measure of insider trading restrictions comes from the 1999 Global 
Competitiveness Report.  This Report records responses from approximately 4,000 executives in 
59 countries to the following survey question regarding the likelihood of insider trading in their 
respective countries: 
3.15 [Insider trading] Insider trading is not common in the domestic market (1=strongly 
disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
We record the average score for all executive responses in a given country and use this as 
that country’s Insider Trading Restriction (ITR) index.  Larger values of ITR correspond with a 
more restrictive insider trading environment in that country. 16  
To supplement the survey-based insider trading measure, we also construct an alternative 
measure based exclusively on countries’ statutory insider trading laws.  Specifically, the Insider 
Trading Law (ITL) index is the sum of three binary variables, Tippee, Tipping and Criminal, 
compiled by Beny (2004, 2006).  These three variables represent the primary elements of the 
law.  Tippee equals 1 if tippees (i.e., a corporate outsider receiving inside information from an 
insider) are subject to insider trading regulation and 0 otherwise.  Tipping equals 1 if an insider 
can be held liable for tipping outsiders and 0 otherwise.  Criminal is 1 if violation of the insider 
trading law is a criminal offense and 0 otherwise.  The ITL index is available for thirty-three of 
the forty-one countries in the sample.  
                                                          
16 This index is also available in years 1996 and 1998.  We use the most recent year’s index as the insider trading 
restriction index, though our results do not change if other years’ indices or their average are used.  Note that there is 
a seven-year lag between the measurement of ITR and the measurement of our compensation variables.  Thus, it is 
possible that during the intervening seven years, countries could initiate changes in insider trading laws.  If so, this 
additional noise in the data will bias our tests against finding any association between insider trading restrictions and 
executive compensation.  We later construct and examine panel datasets in which compensation and insider trading 
are measured in adjacent years. 
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Because ITR has the potential to capture the joint impact of insider trading laws, their 
enforcement, and other factors such as culture and information environment, it is arguably a 
more complete measure of insider trading restrictions than ITL.  However, because ITR is based 
on survey data, it is subject to biases related to the subjective judgments of the responders.  Our 
ITL measure, therefore, provides a useful robustness check.  In later tests, we provide another 
robustness test that makes use of dates of initial prosecution under insider trading laws.   
 
3.3. Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample distribution by country, as well as summary 
measures of each country’s insider trading restrictions.  Our international data consists of 468 
ADR firms from forty different countries for the year 2006, which we supplement with 1,852 
U.S. firms in the 2006 dataset.  On average, there are 12 ADR firms in each country.  However, 
this average masks considerable variation across countries.  Several countries (e.g., Brazil, 
China, and the U.K.) have more than 30 firms while others (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Colombia, 
Hungary, Turkey and Venezuela) have just one observation.   
The data in Panel A also indicate that there is substantial cross-country variation in the 
degree of insider trading restrictions.  The ITR index ranges from 3.18 (Taiwan) to 6.22 
(Luxembourg) with an average of 4.48 and a standard deviation of 0.91.  The ITL index varies 
between 1 and 3 with an average of 2.5.  As of 2006, insider trading laws had been in existence 
for an average of 20 years (2006 minus 1986) and had been enforced for an average of 15 years 
(2006 minus 1991).  Interestingly, some countries have never enforced existing insider trading 
legislation (e.g. China, Colombia) while others have had a long history of enforcement (e.g. 
France, U.S.).   
16 
Consistent with common perception, the U.S. appears to have among the most restrictive 
insider trading laws, with an ITR index of 5.64 (only Luxembourg and the UK are higher).  At 
the other end of the spectrum is Mexico with an ITR of 3.54, ITL of 1, and no evidence that its 
existing laws have ever been enforced.   
Finally, the bottom row of Panel A shows that our survey based measure of insider 
trading restrictions, ITR, is significantly positively correlated with ITL (ρ = 0.58), and negatively 
related to the year in which IT laws first came into existence and the year in of initial IT law 
enforcement.  This implies that corporate executives perceive insider trading as being more 
restricted in countries with stricter insider trading laws and where insider trading laws have 
existed or have been enforced for a longer time.  
Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics for our compensation variables, as well as 
several firm and country-level control variables.  We partition the sample into those firms with 
ITR below the median (4.37) and those above the median and report the significance of the 
difference in average values.  We find that firms in countries with stronger insider trading 
restrictions are characterized by higher total pay.  Specifically, total pay averages just under 
$300,000 US dollars for firms with below median ITR and over $1.6 million for firms with ITR 
greater than median.  Equity incentives (as measured by the sensitivity of executive wealth to a 
1% change in stock price) are not significantly different between low-ITR firms and high-ITR 
firms.   
In addition, we report significant differences in firm and country characteristics between 
the sub-samples of high-ITR and low-ITR firms.  Firms from countries with greater insider 
trading restrictions are characterized by lower profitability and percentage insider ownership, and 
higher board independence and R&D expenditures.  In addition, we find that countries with 
17 
stronger insider trading restrictions have higher GDP per capita and greater stock market 
development (as measured by the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP).  We later control 
for these firm and country-level factors in our compensation regressions.17   
 
4. The Association between Insider Trading Restrictions and Executive Compensation 
In this section, we report our base analyses of the empirical association between insider 
trading restrictions and executive compensation using our sample of U.S. and ADR firms in 
2006.  We begin in Section 4.1 with the univariate association, and then estimate multivariate 
regressions of the association between insider trading restrictions and both compensation levels 
and incentives in Section 4.2. 
 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
Figure 1 contains scatter plots of the univariate association between insider trading 
restrictions and top executive compensation/incentives.  As depicted in Figure 1A, Total Pay is 
highest for U.S. firms and ADR firms from European countries. 18  Within Europe, France, 
Germany, Switzerland and the U.K. pay relatively higher compensation than the rest of Europe.  
Pay levels are lowest in Peru, the Philippines and China.  Notably, the scatter plot depicts a 
positive correlation between the level of executive pay and insider trading restriction: countries 
with high ITR exhibit higher compensation levels.   
                                                          
17 In unreported results, we also find that U.S. firms exhibit some significant differences from ADR firms.  Because 
U.S. firms substantially outnumber the ADR firms, we later test whether our findings are robust to the exclusion of 
U.S. firms.   
18 At first glance, it is surprising that the U.S. firms do not appear to pay much higher compensation than some 
European countries, given prior evidence (e.g., Murphy (1999)).  However, European ADR firms tend to be larger, 
on average, than the typical U.S. firm. In the following multivariate analysis, we control for firm size and other firm 
characteristics and present results separately for ADR firms to avoid possible biases.  
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Figure 1B depicts the univariate association between ITR and total Equity Incentives.  
The univariate association is positive.  Those countries with stronger insider trading restrictions 
(e.g. U.S., U.K., Australia) tend to have greater equity incentives.  Some countries (e.g. China 
and India) are notable outliers, however, in that they exhibit very high equity incentives with few 
country-level restrictions on insider trading.   
Finally, Figure 1C depicts the association between ITR and the Equity Pay Ratio.  
Consistent with prior literature, the U.S. and the U.K. are among the countries paying the highest 
fractions of equity-based compensation (34%-35%).  Finland and China also stand out as 
countries using the most equity-based compensation.  At the other end of the spectrum, several 
countries make no use of equity based compensation at all.  Again, it is notable that there appears 
to be a strong positive correlation between the ITR index and the Equity Pay Ratio.   
 
4.2. Multivariate Regressions 
To provide more formal evidence, we estimate multivariate regressions in which the log 
of equity incentives, log of total compensation, and the equity pay ratio are the dependent 
variables.  In each regression model, we control for several firm characteristics that have been 
shown in prior studies to be associated with compensation levels.  These include the log of the 
book value of total assets, the market-to-book ratio, debt-to-asset ratio, return on assets (ROA), 
measured as the ratio of operating income before depreciation and amortization to lagged assets, 
lagged annual stock return, and the ratio of research and development expenditures (R&D) to 
total assets.  [See, e.g., Aboody and Lev (2000), Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008), Ortiz-
Molina (2007)].  In addition, because corporate governance has been shown to affect executive 
compensation [e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009)], we include board size and board 
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independence as independent variables.  Finally, to control for country-level determinants of 
compensation, we include the logarithm of GDP per capita, the stock market capitalization-to-
GDP ratio, and the anti-director index.  We include industry fixed effects at the 2 digit SIC level 
to control for unobserved industry-specific factors, and compute heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors that are clustered by country.   
Equity Incentives.  In Models (1) and (2) of Table 2, we test the association between the 
log of total equity incentives and insider trading restrictions.  Because of the additional data 
requirements for computing equity incentives at the executive level, these tests are limited to the 
subsample of firms with U.S. style reporting.  Also, because we observe a clustering of 
observations at zero, we estimate these models using a Tobit specification.  These findings 
indicate that the level of equity incentives is positively related to both ITR and ITL.  The impact 
of insider trading restrictions is both statistically significant and economically meaningful.  A 
one-unit increase in ITR corresponds to an over 200% increase in total equity incentives (120% 
for ITL). 19   Consistent with prior literature [e.g., Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) and 
Yermack (1995)], overall equity incentives are positively related to firm size and to the firm’s 
market-to-book ratio.  In addition, total incentives are positively related to stock returns and 
R&D expenditures, and negatively related to leverage, per capita GDP, and the anti-director 
index.  Total incentives are also greater for CEOs and for older executives.   
Total Pay.  In columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 we report results in which the log of total 
compensation is the dependent variable. We again report separate results for our two primary 
                                                          
19 At first glance, the positive association between equity incentives and insider trading restrictions is puzzling in 
light of prior studies that report a negative association between insider ownership and the quality of a country’s 
institutions.  Note, however, that our equity incentives variable represents the dollar change per 1% change in equity 
value, while the insider ownership variable used in the literature is the percentage of shares owned by the insiders.  
The two variables are not highly correlated in our data (ρ = 0.09).  Moreover, our regressions include a number of 
country variables that are meant to capture the general institutional setting of the country.   
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measures of the restrictions on insider trading: the Insider Trading Restriction index (ITR) and 
the Insider Trading Law index (ITL).  Because the firm-level total pay variable is derived from 
the reported aggregate compensation given to executive officers or officers and directors, we also 
include a dummy variable indicating whether the total pay figure involves non-executive 
directors.  This controls for any systematic difference in pay between non-executive directors 
and executive officers.   
The results in columns (3) and (4) indicate a significant association between insider 
trading restrictions and total compensation.  The coefficient on insider trading restrictions is 
significantly positive using either ITR or ITL as the measure of insider trading restrictions.  
Moreover, the economic magnitude of the coefficient on insider trading restrictions is 
substantial.  For example, the ITR coefficient of 0.385 in column (3) implies that an increase of 
one unit in ITR corresponds to a 38.5% increase in Total Pay.  Based on the full-sample mean 
value of the Ln(Total Pay) of 13.3 at the firm level, this change amounts to approximately 
$230,000 (U.S.).   
A positive association between insider trading restrictions and total compensation is 
consistent with two potential channels.  First, it might reflect a substitution between insider 
trading profits and the level of compensation.  Second, it might be the byproduct of differences 
in the use of incentives.  That is, cross-country differences in the level of executive 
compensation might reflect increased risk premia resulting from differences in the use of equity 
incentives.  To assess this possibility, we also control for equity incentives in the total pay 
regressions.  Because the equity incentives variable is only available for the subsample of 
countries and firms with U.S. style reporting, we present the results separately in columns (5) 
and (6).  We keep the compensation and incentive variables at the executive level and add an 
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indicator for CEOs and executive age as controls.  The results show a significantly positive 
correlation between equity incentives and total pay, consistent with Conyon et al. (2011).  The 
coefficients on insider trading restrictions, though similar in magnitude to columns (3) and (4), 
become statistically insignificant. Thus, we cannot rule out that the observed association between 
insider trading restrictions and total pay is a byproduct of the relation between insider trading 
restrictions and equity incentives.  
As for the control variables, consistent with prior literature, we find that level of pay is 
positively associated with firm size and information asymmetry (as measured by R&D-to-assets).  
In addition, total pay is positively associated with GDP per capita and (in some specifications) 
with board independence and the market-to-book ratio.  Not surprisingly, total pay is 
significantly lower if both executive officers and non-executive directors are included in firm 
aggregate total pay.  At the executive level and in the subsample with U.S. style reporting, total 
pay is negatively related to financial leverage and positively related to ROA and stock returns.  
Total pay is also higher for the CEO and for older executives.  
Equity Pay Ratio.  Finally, Models (7)-(10) of Table 2 report the results of similar Tobit 
regressions in which we test the association between insider trading restrictions and equity 
incentive pay.  Since the theory discussed earlier does not yield precise predictions about the 
association between insider trading restrictions and the flow of incentives, the results in Columns 
(7)-(10) should be viewed as descriptive.   
The results indicate a significant positive association between insider trading restrictions 
and the proportion of equity-based incentive compensation.  The coefficient on insider trading 
restrictions is statistically significant, regardless of whether ITR or ITL is used as the measure of 
insider trading restrictions.  Moreover, the effect is economically large; a one-unit increase in 
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ITR corresponds to a nearly 22 percentage point increase in the equity pay ratio (Model 5).  This 
marginal impact is large relative to the unconditional average Equity Pay ratio of 0.17.  
Moreover, including equity incentives as a control does not mitigate the statistical significance of 
the effect (columns 9-10).   
Most control variables depict the same associations with Equity Pay Ratio as those with 
overall equity incentives except that firm performance (ROA and stock return) is negatively 
related to the equity pay ratio while positively related to overall equity incentives.  In addition, 
board independence and stock market capitalization are positively related to the equity pay ratio 
while unrelated to total equity incentives.  
 
5. Additional Tests 
 Our findings to this point indicate that equity incentives are positively related to insider 
trading restrictions.  We also find that the level of top executive total pay is positively associated 
with insider trading restrictions.  However, we cannot reject that this finding is driven by the 
greater use of equity incentives (and, therefore, higher risk premium) in countries with stronger 
insider trading restrictions.   
These findings are consistent with several potential explanations.  Compensation 
incentives might be determined by insider trading restrictions, either because firms view insider 
trading profits and direct incentives as substitutes, or because greater insider trading restrictions 
allow firms to optimally use more equity incentives.  Alternatively, countries might respond to 
the greater use of equity incentives within their country by imposing stronger insider trading 
laws in order to mitigate trading-related agency conflicts with executives.  Finally, it is possible 
that our baseline findings are spurious because insider trading restrictions are correlated with 
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other country factors that have been omitted from our regression models.  In this section, we 
conduct several additional tests to explore alternative explanations for our findings.   
 
5.1. Panel Data Analysis 
 Our regression models omit country factors that are potentially correlated with both 
insider trading restrictions and compensation.  As one approach to testing whether the exclusion 
of these factors influences our results, we exploit within-country, time-series variation in insider 
trading restrictions to provide further evidence on the link between insider trading restrictions 
and compensation.  Recall that the ITR index is available from the Global Competitiveness 
Reports for three years: 1996, 1998 and 1999.  Over these three years, some countries exhibit 
large changes in insider trading restrictions.  For example, the ITR index for Italy is 2.92 in 
1996, and then increases to 3.88 in 1998, and to 4.38 in 1999.  Italy’s increases in ITR occurred 
with its corporate governance law reform in early 1998 that strengthened insider trading 
regulation.20  These types of within-country changes allow for identification in panel regressions 
in which we include country fixed effects to capture any time-invariant country factors and year 
fixed effects to capture common macroeconomic influences on compensation.   
 Unfortunately, EDGAR contains relatively few 20-F reports in the 1990s making it 
difficult to achieve a sample size sufficiently large to estimate panel regressions.21  Therefore, 
we extract information on incentives from the Global Competitiveness Reports of 1996, 1998 
and 1999.  The 1996 survey asks about non-wage incentives: “Non-wage incentives (such as 
                                                          
20 See Chapter IV, Unauthorized use of inside information and manipulation involving financial instruments, under 
Title I in Part V of the Italian Legislative decree 58 of 24 February 1998: Consolidated law on financial 
intermediation. Source: European Corporate Governance Institute. 
21 Specifically, our matching of the 20-F compensation data with the ITR index data yields only 88 ADR firms from 
25 different countries.  
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profit sharing and stock purchase plans) are used effectively to motivate employees (1=strongly 
disagree, 6=strongly agree)”.  The 1998 and 1999 surveys both ask about performance pay: 
“Compensation policies link pay closely with job performance (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly 
agree)”.  Our operating assumption is that answers to these questions are correlated with the 
company’s use of incentive compensation.  This data is available for a broader set of countries, 
ranging from 49 in 1996 to 59 in 1999.  Appendix B lists the ITR index for each country during 
the three years spanning our panel dataset.  
Table 3 reports the results from two sets of regressions.  In the first, we estimate 
regressions of the survey-based Incentive Pay Measure (IPM) on ITR, country GDP per capita 
and stock market capitalization to GDP.22  This first set of regressions contains both country and 
year fixed effects.  In the second set of regressions, we estimate the association between annual 
changes in IPM and changes in ITR.  Because these are change regressions, country fixed effects 
are not included.  Note also that, because all variables are country level, no firm characteristics 
are included as controls.  
The results in Columns (1)–(2) of Table 3 indicate that, controlling for country and year 
fixed effects, the incentive pay measure is significantly associated with insider trading 
restrictions.  Moreover, as indicated in Columns (3)-(4), changes in the incentive pay measure 
are significantly associated with changes in insider trading restrictions.  These findings provide 
further confidence that our main findings are not being driven by some correlated omitted 
variable at the country level.  Taken at face value, the results imply that firms adjust the use of 
incentives in response to changes in their country’s insider trading environment.   
 
                                                          
22 Note that although our baseline regressions in Table 2 include the anti-director index, we exclude that index from 
our panel regressions because there is just one observation on the index for each country. 
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5.2. Evidence from Initial Enforcement of Insider Trading Laws 
 Our findings establish an association between executive compensation and either 
perceptions of insider trading restrictions (ITR) or an index of the country’s statutory restrictions 
(ITL).  As shown in Table 1, however, countries differ in when they enforce the statutory insider 
trading laws in a court of law for the first time.  Prior literature finds that the dates of initial 
enforcement mark meaningful changes in insider trading regimes around the world.  That is, 
insider trading becomes more restricted following initial enforcement of insider trading laws 
[Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2005) and Bekaert, Harvey, 
and Lundblad (2001)].  Because the initial enforcement of insider trading laws represents a 
discrete change in insider trading restrictions, tests of changes in compensation in the period 
following the dates of initial enforcement can thus provide additional evidence of the link 
between insider trading restrictions and executive compensation.  
Unfortunately, as noted earlier, compensation data from ADR 20-F reports is available 
for only a limited time period.  Thus, for this analysis, we rely on the Worldwide Total 
Remuneration reports published by Towers Perrin for the executive pay data.  This data covers 
25 countries between 1994 and 2001 comprising 182 country-year observations, and contains 
information about total CEO pay and the Equity Pay Ratio. 23  We construct an IT Enforce 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for the year of and years following the initial 
enforcement, and 0 otherwise.  We then estimate panel regressions of total compensation and the 
equity pay ratio on IT Enforce and the country-level control variables (GDP per capita and stock 
market capitalization).  In the total compensation regressions, we also include the equity pay 
ratio as an imperfect control for the possibility that executives demand a risk premium for 
                                                          




holding greater equity incentives.  In these models, therefore, the coefficient on IT Enforce 
captures the differences in total compensation and the incremental flow of equity incentives 
between country-years prior to enforcement and country-years following enforcement of insider 
trading laws.24  Appendix C lists the availability of data for each country.  
Panel A of Table 4 summarizes the variables for subsamples divided by IT Enforce.  
There are 43 pre-enforcement country-years and 139 post-enforcement country-years.  Both total 
pay and the equity pay ratio are higher in the years following initial enforcement of insider 
trading laws.  These differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level using a two-sample 
t-test.   
The increases in total pay and the equity pay ratio observed in Panel A can originate from 
three sources: (i) an increase following enforcement within the same country (the time series 
effect), (ii) a cross-sectional difference between enforced and non-enforced countries (the cross 
sectional effect), or (iii) a general increasing time trend independent of enforcement (the time 
trend).  In the regression analysis, we include year dummy variables to eliminate the time trend.  
We also examine country-adjusted variables, which are constructed by subtracting country 
averages from the raw variables.  For each raw variable, its country average is the average over 
all years for that country.25   
Panel B of Table 4 reports the regression results.  Columns (1) and (2) report results in 
which the log of total pay is the dependent variable, while columns (3) and (4) report results in 
which the equity pay ratio is the dependent variable.  Tests based on the raw variables  (columns 
1 and 3) indicate that, controlling for GDP per capita and stock market capitalization, the equity 
                                                          
24 Because there are only four country-years in the sample prior to the initial enactment of insider trading laws, we 
do not examine the initial enactment dates. 
25 Our estimation approach is nearly equivalent to estimating models including country fixed effects.  The only 
difference is that fixed effects models effectively country-adjust all the independent variables, including the IT 
Enforce dummy variable, whereas in the models in Table 4, the dummy variable is not country-adjusted.   
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pay ratio is significantly higher in the country-years after initial enforcement of insider trading 
laws.  More importantly, Columns (2) and (4) indicate that both country-adjusted total pay and 
equity pay ratio are significantly larger following initial enforcement of insider trading laws (t 
statistics for the IT Enforce coefficients are 2.38 and 2.51, respectively).  Within a country, total 
pay increases by an average of 13.6% and the fraction of equity incentive pay in total pay 
increases by 1.2 percentage points after initial insider trading law enforcement.   
Overall, therefore, the findings in Table 4 provide support for the view that following 
initial enforcement of insider trading laws that plausibly reduce the ability of insiders to trade in 
their own shares, firms appear to respond by increasing the use of equity incentives in the 
compensation contract.  Initial enforcement of insider trading laws is also associated with higher 
subsequent levels of compensation, though again this might just reflect the higher required risk 
premium associated with the greater use of equity incentives.  
 
5.3. Insider ownership and the association between ITR and compensation 
 To provide further evidence, we analyze the link between insider ownership and the 
association between insider trading restrictions and compensation.  As noted in Kyle (1985), 
insider trading is a wealth transfer from uninformed traders to informed traders (insiders).  
Therefore, insider trading profits will be a decreasing function of the relative number of insiders.  
Consistent with this prediction, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) find that higher levels of inside ownership 
are associated with lower insider trading profits.  If insider trading profits represent a substitute 
form of compensation, we expect that restrictions on insider trading will have a smaller impact 
on compensation arrangements in firms with higher inside ownership since insider trading profits 
are lower in these firms.  Moreover, because the incentives of executives with high inside 
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ownership are already well-aligned with those of shareholders, using insider trading as a form of 
incentive compensation [e.g., Carlton and Fischel (1983) and Manne (1966)] will be less 
important. 
 A similar set of predictions can be generated under the view that more stringent insider 
trading laws allow firms to optimally use greater equity incentives.  Again, because the 
incentives of executives with high inside ownership are already well-aligned with those of 
shareholders, insider trading restrictions should have less impact on these firms, thereby 
attenuating the positive association between insider trading restrictions and equity incentives.  
By contrast, under the view that our primary results are driven by a correlated omitted variable, 
we expect the level of insider ownership to have no impact on the association between insider 
trading restrictions and executive compensation.   
To test these predictions, we measure insider ownership for the ADR and US firms as the 
fractional equity ownership (both direct and indirect) of the top executive as reported in the 20-F 
filings.26  We then include an indicator variable equal to one if insider ownership is greater than 
its country-year median, and the interaction of this indicator with insider trading restrictions in 
our compensation regressions.  The advantage of the indicator variable is that it allows us to 
abstract from country-level differences in insider ownership; therefore, any results are entirely 
due to within-country variation in insider ownership and how it relates to the effect of insider 
trading restrictions on compensation.27  The models are estimated with the full set of control 
variables from Table 2 as well as industry fixed effects although these coefficient estimates are 
not reported in the table for conciseness.   
                                                          
26 As before, this necessarily limits the analysis to those ADR firms with U.S. style reporting. 
 
27 Our results are similar if we repeat the analysis using fractional insider ownership directly.  
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In the regressions for overall equity incentives in Models (1)-(2) of Table 5, the 
coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, indicating that higher 
ownership attenuates the positive association between insider trading restrictions and equity 
incentives.  In models (3)-(6), we repeat the analysis, but now use the log of Total Pay as the 
dependent variable.  These models also include the log of equity incentives as an additional 
independent variable.  In these models, we again find that higher insider ownership weakens the 
association between insider trading restrictions and total pay.  Moreover, the results in Models 
(5)-(6) suggest that, even after controlling for overall equity incentives, insider trading 
restrictions have a significantly positive association with total pay for firms with low insider 
ownership (i.e., setting InsOwn equal to zero).   
 
5.4. Other robustness tests 
We conduct a number of other robustness checks that, for purposes of brevity, are not 
reported in a separate table.  First, we test whether our main findings differ between developed 
and lesser developed countries (LDCs).  Consistent with the view that law enforcement is less 
effective in LDCs, we find that the association between insider trading restrictions (as measured 
by ITL) and executive compensation is virtually non-existent in LDCs.28  Second, to rule out the 
possibility that a small set of countries drive the results, we exclude from the analysis those 
countries with more than 30 firms in the sample (Brazil, China, U.K., and U.S.).  Our findings 
are robust to the exclusion of these firms.  Third, because executive compensation might differ in 
regulated industries, we exclude both utilities (SIC codes 4900 to 4949) and financial firms (SIC 
codes 6000 to 6999).  Again, our results are qualitatively unchanged.  Fourth, we limit the 
                                                          
28 We follow Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) to define developed and less developed countries.  
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sample to the set of CEOs only and continue to find a significant positive association between 
Equity Incentives and insider trading restrictions.   
Fifth, it is possible that cross-listing binds the sample ADR firms to better quality 
institutions.  Because better institutions are associated with lower insider ownership [see, for 
example, Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (2004)], perhaps the impact of insider trading 
restrictions is unique to our cross-listed sample.  To test this possibility, we start with the list of 
countries and their first insider trading law enforcement events in Table 1.  For each event, we 
then download data from Datastream and Worldscope covering the period from three years 
before the initial enforcement year through three years after the enforcement.  We extract 
information about closely-held shares, firm characteristics and SIC industry codes.  After 
eliminating firms with missing data, this leaves us with a panel of 4,374 firm-year observations 
covering 22 countries.  We then follow the approach from Table 4 and test whether the fraction 
of closely held shares (both raw and adjusted for the country average) increases in the years 
following initial enforcement of insider trading laws.  Following our test in Table 5, we 
differentiate firms that begin with low or high ownership because the effect of insider trading 
restrictions should be stronger for firms with lower ownership.  Consistent with our earlier 
findings, our results, reported in Table 6, indicate a significant increase in ownership in the years 
following initial enforcement for firms with below-median lagged ownership.  For firms with 
above-median ownership, the change in ownership is statistically insignificant following initial 





6. Do insider trading restrictions reduce the insider trading profits of executives? 
 To this point, our results support a causal link that runs from insider trading restrictions to 
equity incentives.  Such a causal link might be due to either a substitution between insider 
trading profits and direct executive compensation or to the existence of stronger insider trading 
laws allowing firms to optimally use more incentives.  The former assumes that insider trading 
restrictions are correlated with actual reductions in trading profits for executives, while the latter 
does not.  Thus, one way to distinguish between these two views is to report evidence on the 
extent to which insider trading restrictions actually reduce insider trading profits.  Unfortunately, 
outside of the U.S. and U.K., we are unaware of any systematic data on insider transactions or 
the profitability of insider trading.   
To provide indirect evidence that our measures of insider trading restrictions are 
associated with diminished insider profits, we analyze the run-up in stock prices of target firms 
prior to acquisition announcements in each of our sample countries.  Prior studies find that pre-
acquisition announcement price run-ups are attributable to informed trading by insiders. For 
example, Agrawal and Nasser (2012) report significant increases in net purchases by top 
executives in the six months prior to takeover announcements.  Moreover, Arshadi and Eyssell 
(1991) document a significantly positive association between net insider purchase volume and 
abnormal returns for target firms prior to tender offer announcements.  Taken together, these 
findings imply that the size of the run-up prior to acquisition announcements is correlated with 
the extent of informed insider trading and, hence, insider profits. 
Following this logic, therefore, we conduct similar tests in our sample countries by 
estimating regressions of the abnormal price run-up in the month prior to takeover 
announcements on our measures of insider trading restrictions, ITR and ITL, and a series of 
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control variables.  Specifically, we first download from SDC Platinum all completed tender 
offers announced between 1978 and 2011 that involve target firms in countries for which we 
have insider trading restriction data.  We require the transaction value to be at least $10 million 
and include only transactions in which 100% of the target firm’s ownership is transferred.  This 
process results in a sample of 3,007 takeover events in 31 different countries.   
For each target firm and its local stock market index, we obtain daily stock return data 
from Datastream.  We compute daily abnormal stock returns for each firm as the difference 
between the stock return of the target firm and the return of the local stock market index on the 
same day.  Following prior literature [e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Keown and Pinkerton 
(1981), Meulbroek (1992)], we define pre-takeover announcement price run-up as the ratio of the 
cumulative abnormal return during the 30 days ending one day prior to the takeover 
announcement date to the cumulative abnormal return from 30 days prior to announcement 
through one day following the announcement date.29  The average run-up in the sample is 0.51, 
but exhibits substantial cross-sectional variation (standard deviation = 0.95). 
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 7 report estimates from cross-sectional regressions of the pre-
takeover announcement price run-up on our insider trading restriction measures and a set of other 
potential determinants of the run-up, including country characteristics (GDP per capita, stock 
market capitalization and the revised anti-director index), takeover deal characteristics 
(transaction value, payment method, hostility and the solicitation status), as well as industry and 
year fixed-effects.  The first two columns report estimates from regressions using the entire 
sample and the ITR and ITL index, respectively, as a measure of insider trading restrictions.  
Consistent with insider trading restrictions curtailing actual insider trading, the results indicate a 
                                                          
29 Our results are not sensitive the length of the pre-announcement period.  We obtain similar results with six-month, 
two-month, and one-week pre-announcement windows.   
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significant negative association between the price run-up and insider trading restrictions.  In 
economic terms, a one unit increase in the ITR index corresponds to a decline in the one month 
price run-up of about 9 percentage points, which approximately equals 20% of the average level 
of the run-up and 10% of its standard deviation.  
To ensure that over-represented countries are not driving the results, we also exclude 
countries with 100 observations or more (Australia, Canada, U.K., and U.S.) and re-estimate the 
regression model from column (1). The results, presented in column (3), are highly consistent 
with the other models.  Because the ITR index is measured in 1999, we conjecture that it should 
be most relevant to the price run-ups in years surrounding 1999.  Therefore, in column (4), we 
restrict our sample to the 1996-2002 period and repeat the analysis.  Consistent with our 
conjecture, the ITR index has an unambiguously greater and statistically significant coefficient 
than in all other columns.  Finally, we examine the change in price run-ups around initial 
enforcement dates of insider trading laws and present the results in column (5).  This 
supplementary analysis allows us to include country fixed-effects in addition to industry and year 
fixed effects, thereby controlling for country-specific components of price run-ups.  Although the 
power of this test is weakened by the fact that over 90% of the sample years are after the 
enforcement dates, the insider trading enforcement dummy nonetheless has a negative coefficient 
(t-stat = -1.74), suggesting that pre-takeover announcement run-ups are significantly reduced 
following initial insider trading law enforcement.  
Collectively, therefore, the evidence in Table 7 is consistent with the view that our 
measures of insider trading restrictions capture meaningful reductions in actual insider trading.  
Nonetheless, it is important to note that even if stronger restrictions on insider trading are 
associated with lower insider trading profits, it does not necessarily follow that such restrictions 
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reduce the trading profits of executives.  Although Arshadi and Eyssell (1991) report a reduction 
in net insider purchases prior to tender offer announcements following the passage of a new 
insider trading law in the U.S., they also  find that the largest effect is on trading by beneficial 
owners of the target’s shares rather than the target’s top executives.  Our finding of lower run-
ups in countries with stronger insider trading restrictions can thus be viewed as evidence of 
reduced trading profits for executives only if the trades of executives are correlated with those of 
other beneficial owners.  Consequently, future research with improved data on insider trading is 
required to conclusively determine whether executive trading profits are indeed lower in 
countries with stronger insider trading laws.   
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
 We exploit variation in insider trading restrictions across countries to investigate the link 
between such restrictions and top executive compensation and incentives.  Our results indicate 
that top executives are significantly more highly paid and hold more equity incentives in 
countries with stronger insider trading restrictions.  These findings are robust to the inclusion of 
possible country-level and firm-level omitted variables, to panel data specifications, to 
alternative definitions of insider trading restrictions/enforcement, and to alternative sampling 
criteria.  We also find significant increases in top executive pay and the use of equity-based 
incentives in the period immediately following the initial enforcement of insider trading laws.   
Our findings thus identify insider trading laws as an important (though certainly not the 
only) channel through which cross-country variation in pay practices can be explained.  
Although prior studies [e.g., Fernandes et al. (2012); Conyon and Schwalbach (1997)] hint at 
country-level institutional determinants of compensation structure, identification of the precise 
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institutional channels for cross-country variation in pay practices has been elusive.  We find that 
variation in restrictions on insider trading across countries explains a significant amount of the 
cross-country variation in both the level of explicit pay and the use of equity incentives.   
These findings are consistent with two (not mutually exclusive) explanations.  First, it is 
possible that insider trading is an implicit form of compensation and incentives.  Thus, when 
insider trading is restricted, equilibrium in the labor market forces firms to increase total pay and 
equity incentives.  Second, it is possible that stronger insider trading laws allow firms to 
optimally use greater equity incentives, which in turn, causes total pay to be higher due to 
managerial risk aversion.  Although we provide some indirect evidence that is suggestive of the 
first view, future research that documents whether stronger insider trading laws are associated 
with lower executive trading profits is required to establish which explanation best fits the data.   
Finally, our findings also complement and extend the large literature on law and finance.  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) conclude that laws related to investor 
protection and their enforcement have an important influence on the distribution of ownership 
structures across countries.  Our findings highlight another important influence of law on 
finance; namely that laws restricting insider trading affect both the equilibrium level and the use 
of equity incentives in top executive compensation.  One caveat, however, is that our results do 
not address the efficiency of such laws, nor do we attempt to explain why some countries impose 
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Figure 1: Insider Trading Restriction index and Executive Compensation, 2006 
Scatter plots of country-level executive compensation variables against the Insider Trading Restriction 
(ITR) index are shown for the year of 2006. The country-level compensation variables are constructed 
from the equal-weighted averages of all firms for each country. Figure 1A corresponds to total pay in 
logarithms, Figure 1B corresponds to equity incentives in logarithm, and Figure 1C corresponds to the 
equity pay ratio.  
 





















































































































































Panel A reports the sample distribution and the insider trading variables by country. A firm is regarded as 
following U.S. style reporting if it reports some compensation data at the executive level. Panel B 
presents variable summary statistics, separately for firms in lower and higher than median ITR countries. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Sample description by country 
Country 
World Bank 
Code # firms 










Argentina ARG 14 0 3.88 2 1991 1995 
Australia AUS 18 18 5.59 3 1991 1996 
Austria AUT 1 0 4.83 2 1993 Never 
Belgium BEL 1 1 5.41 3 1990 1994 
Brazil BRA 32 0 3.72 2 1976 1978 
Chile CHL 15 2 4.16 - 1981 1996 
China CHN 63 10 3.45 - 1993 Never 
Colombia COL 1 0 3.42 - 1990 Never 
Denmark DNK 4 2 6 3 1991 1996 
Finland FIN 3 3 5.53 3 1989 1993 
France FRA 25 24 5.17 3 1967 1975 
Germany DEU 20 20 5.24 3 1994 1995 
Greece GRC 4 0 3.41 2 1988 1996 
Hong Kong SAR HKG 17 6 3.94 2 1991 1994 
Hungary HUN 1 0 3.81 - 1994 1995 
India IND 14 13 3.53 2 1992 1998 
Indonesia IDN 2 0 3.56 2 1991 1996 
Ireland IRL 10 7 5.19 3 1990 Never 
Israel ISR 8 1 4.39 2 1981 1989 
Italy ITA 11 7 4.38 3 1991 1996 
Japan JPN 26 0 5.26 2 1988 1990 
Luxembourg LUX 6 2 6.22 3 1991 Never 
Mexico MEX 21 0 3.54 1 1975 Never 
Netherlands NLD 19 18 5.2 3 1989 1994 
New Zealand NZL 2 1 5.4 2 1988 Never 
Norway NOR 6 5 4.24 1 1985 1990 
Peru PER 2 0 3.99 - 1991 1994 
Philippines PHL 2 0 3.48 2 1982 Never 
Portugal PRT 2 1 4.37 3 1986 Never 
Russia RUS 5 0 3.38 - 1996 Never 
Singapore SGP 2 2 5.58 3 1973 1978 
South Africa ZAF 8 7 3.74 2 1989 Never 
South Korea KOR 15 0 4.1 3 1976 1988 
Spain ESP 8 3 4.68 2 1994 1998 
Sweden SWE 8 6 5.58 3 1971 1990 
Switzerland CHE 11 7 4.67 3 1988 1995 
Taiwan TWN 8 2 3.18 3 1988 1989 
Turkey TUR 1 0 3.58 - 1981 1996 
United Kingdom GBR 51 49 5.85 3 1980 1981 
United States USA 1,852 1,852 5.64 3 1934 1961 
Venezuela VEN 1 0 3.3 - 1998 Never 
Total  2,320 2,069     
 
 
Average     4.48 2.5 1986 1991 
Standard deviation     0.91 0.6 10.91 8.42 
Correlation with ITR  
 
 1 0.583 -0.254 -0.327 
    (P-value)  
 
   (0.001) (0.110) (0.037) 
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Panel B. Variable Summary Statistics 




  1: ITR<=4.37   
 
  2: ITR>4.37   
 
2 minus 1 
Executive Compensation Variables: 
Firm-level variables: 
            Ln(Total Pay) 233 12.6 12.7 1.3 
 
2,083 14.3 14.2 0.9 
 
1.7 0.00 
Indicator that total pay includes directors 234 0.59 1.00 0.49 
 
2,086 0.03 0.00 0.18 
 
-0.55 0.00 
Equity Pay Ratio 234 0.14 0.00 0.28 
 
2,086 0.33 0.35 0.22 
 
0.19 0.00 
Ln(Equity Incentives) 34 10.4 11.4 5.3  1,631 10.6 10.8 1.9  0.2 0.84 
             Control variables: 
            Firm control variables: 
            Ln(Asset) 230 7.78 7.81 1.91 
 
2,083 7.82 7.65 1.94 
 
0.04 0.76 
M/B 230 1.87 1.26 1.91 
 
1,867 1.97 1.59 1.28 
 
0.10 0.44 
D/A 230 0.20 0.20 0.17 
 
1,883 0.22 0.19 0.21 
 
0.02 0.19 
ROA 206 0.14 0.12 0.09 
 
1,710 0.12 0.12 0.15 
 
-0.02 0.00 
Stock return 149 0.15 0.18 0.33 
 
1,692 0.17 0.16 0.27 
 
0.02 0.40 
Board size 234 10.00 9.00 3.76 
 
1,555 9.75 9.00 2.85 
 
-0.25 0.34 
Board independence 225 0.56 0.57 0.23 
 
1,548 0.70 0.73 0.16 
 
0.14 0.00 
R&D-to-asset 230 0.009 0.000 0.024 
 
2,083 0.027 0.000 0.065 
 
0.018 0.00 
Insider ownership 162 22.86 15.97 24.98 
 
1,995 3.26 0.07 9.43 
 
-19.61 0.00 
Country control variables: 
           Ln(GDP per capita) 234 9.3 9.1 0.6 
 
2,086 10.6 10.6 0.1 
 
1.3 0.00 
Stock Market Cap/GDP 234 1.10 0.90 1.11 
 
2,086 1.46 1.48 0.20 
 
0.36 0.00 





Regression Analysis of the Relation between Insider Trading Restriction and Executive Compensation 
This table presents results from Tobit regressions of Ln(Equity Incentives), OLS regressions of Ln(Total Pay) and Tobit regressions of Equity Pay Ratio 
on insider trading restrictions measures and control variables. The regressions in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 are conducted at the firm level for the full sample 
of ADR firms with U.S. firms. Columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10 present regression results at the executive level for the subsample of firms with U.S. style 
reporting. All variable definitions can be found in Appendix A. Industry fixed effects are at the 2-digit SIC level. T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by country and robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 






Ln(Equity Incentives) abc 
Ln(Total Pay) abc Equity Pay Ratio 
Sample 
Executive level, US style 
reporting 
 
Firm level Executive level, US style reporting  Firm level 
Executive level, US style 
reporting 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) 
Insider Trading Restrictions Measure: 















ITL index  1.208*  
 
0.303*  0.353 
  
0.164***  0.322*** 
 
 (1.78)  
 
(1.89)  (0.91) 
  
(3.38)  (2.82) 
Other incentives:             
Ln(Equity incentives)      0.069*** 0.070***    -0.002 -0.001 
      (6.65) (6.48)    (-0.94) (-0.34) 
Firm Controls:    
  
  
   
  
Ln(Asset) 0.567*** 0.570***  0.339*** 0.362*** 0.404*** 0.403*** 
 
0.047*** 0.048*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 
 
(4.80) (4.92)  (4.22) (5.25) (14.79) (14.51) 
 
(5.25) (5.54) (6.28) (5.87) 
M/B 0.326*** 0.339***  0.071** 0.083* -0.081 -0.082 
 
0.034*** 0.031*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 
 
(2.92) (3.13)  (2.03) (1.77) (-0.64) (-0.65) 
 
(3.44) (2.77) (8.09) (8.77) 
D/A -0.750*** -0.758***  0.175 0.156 -0.226** -0.224** 
 
0.067* 0.043 -0.020 -0.017 
 
(-3.25) (-3.36)  (1.24) (1.13) (-2.54) (-2.49) 
 
(1.74) (1.53) (-1.04) (-0.76) 
ROA 0.917 0.886  -0.324 -0.426 0.748* 0.772* 
 
-0.121 -0.096 -0.140** -0.128** 
 
(1.07) (1.06)  (-1.17) (-1.51) (1.77) (1.80) 
 
(-1.37) (-1.25) (-2.44) (-2.34) 
Stock return 0.325** 0.327**  -0.119 -0.125 0.208*** 0.216*** 
 
-0.050* -0.022 -0.078*** -0.072*** 
 
(2.23) (2.24)  (-0.75) (-0.64) (4.49) (5.20) 
 
(-1.67) (-0.69) (-3.62) (-4.03) 
Board size 0.024 0.017  0.006 0.004 -0.011 -0.012 
 
-0.004 -0.005 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(1.49) (1.00)  (0.44) (0.30) (-0.43) (-0.43) 
 
(-1.30) (-1.56) (3.31) (3.07) 
Board independence -0.317 -0.247  0.566** 0.294 0.488** 0.489** 
 
0.117* 0.150*** 0.247*** 0.244*** 
 
(-0.65) (-0.40)  (2.12) (1.38) (2.38) (2.28) 
 
(1.95) (3.80) (8.03) (8.36) 
R&D-to-asset 2.559*** 2.272***  1.461*** 1.456** 1.103** 1.091** 
 
0.595*** 0.543*** 0.313** 0.298* 
 
(2.82) (2.72)  (2.79) (2.60) (2.55) (2.58) 
 
(3.63) (2.97) (2.24) (1.94) 
Country Controls:    
  
  
   
  
Ln(GDP per capita) -3.626** -1.774***  0.349** 0.453*** 0.761** 0.815*** 
 
-0.056 0.202** 0.014 0.130 
 
(-2.48) (-3.43)  (2.07) (3.14) (2.35) (3.65) 
 
(-0.96) (2.09) (0.14) (1.48) 
Stock Market Cap/GDP 0.584 0.207  0.080 0.101 0.040 0.026 
 
0.105*** 0.059* 0.192*** 0.164*** 
 
(0.60) (0.22)  (1.13) (1.18) (0.24) (0.17) 
 
(4.31) (1.90) (3.64) (2.64) 
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Anti-director index -1.348*** -0.912***  -0.015 -0.084 0.049 0.073 
 
-0.074*** -0.008 -0.079** -0.045 
 
(-3.15) (-2.90)  (-0.19) (-1.01) (0.64) (1.20) 
 
(-3.69) (-0.32) (-2.51) (-1.45) 
Indicator that total pay     -0.992*** -0.960***   
   
  
  includes directors    (-9.22) (-7.61)   
   
  
Executive Controls:             
CEO indicator 1.631*** 1.612***    0.784*** 0.785***    0.080*** 0.078*** 
 (33.96) (26.39)    (24.14) (24.55)    (17.86) (14.99) 
Executive age 0.061*** 0.061***    0.004*** 0.003***    -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (7.01) (6.46)    (3.44) (3.26)    (-7.04) (-7.12) 
Constant 2.046*** 2.059***  5.534*** 5.865*** 0.717 0.025 
 
0.229*** 0.224*** 0.280*** 0.280*** 
 
(18.02) (16.39)  (3.49) (3.87) (0.32) (0.02) 
 
(9.96) (11.93) (136.90) (121.97) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of country clusters 16 15  40 33 16 15 
 
40 33 16 15 
Number of observations 1,715 1,710  1,165 1,118 1,693 1,688 
 
1,166 1,119 1,693 1,688 
Adj./Pseudo R2 0.096 0.093  0.586 0.572 0.577 0.571 
 




Panel Data Regressions of Incentive Pay on Insider Trading Restriction, 1996-1999 
This table presents results from regressions of the survey-based Incentive Pay Measure (IPM) on the 
Insider Trading Restriction Index and control variables. For the change specification, the dependent 
variable is the year-on-year change of IPM and the independent variables are the year-on-year changes of 
their level counterparts. All variable definitions can be found in Appendix A. T-statistics based on 
standard errors clustered by country and robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in the parentheses below 
the estimated coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  




 (3) (4) 
 ITR index 0.474*** 0.380** 
 





 (2.67) (2.16) 









  (-0.42) 








  (-0.35) 
 Constant 2.114*** 10.370 
 





 (10.09) (8.35) 
 Fixed Effects No Country, Year   No Year 
 Number of country clusters 59 56 
 
 53 50 
 Number of observations 161 154 
 
 102 98 
 Adj. R2 0.324 0.794 
 





Relation between Insider Trading Laws and Executive Compensation 
This table presents variable summary statistics (Panel A) and results from regressions of the logarithmic 
Total Pay and the Equity Pay Ratio on IT Enforce and control variables (Panel B). IT Enforce is an 
indicator for the year of and years following the initial enforcement of insider trading laws. In columns 1 
and 3, all variables are raw variables. In columns 2 and 4, all variables are country-adjusted. A country-
adjusted variable is the raw variable adjusted by its country average. Year indicators are included in all 
models. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by country and robust to heteroskedasticity are 
reported in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Variable Summary Statistics 
Variable (Raw) 
 




IT Enforce=0 (N=43) 
 
IT Enforce=1 (N=139)   
Ln(Total Pay) 
 
12.24 12.31 0.49 
  
12.61 12.66 0.40  0.37 <0.001 
Equity Pay Ratio 
 
0.030 0.000 0.055 
  
0.114 0.115 0.107  0.084 <0.001 
Ln(GDP per capita) 
 
8.81 8.61 0.77 
  
9.79 9.96 0.62  0.98 <0.001 
Stock Market Cap/GDP 
 
0.53 0.34 0.52 
  
1.03 0.88 0.72  0.50 <0.001 
Panel B. Regressions 










(1) (2)  
 
(3) (4)  
IT Enforce 0.058 0.136**  
 
0.068*** 0.012**  
 
(0.25) (2.38)  
 
(3.74) (2.51)  
Equity Pay Ratio 2.403*** 0.715*  
   
 
 
(4.75) (1.79)  
   
 
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.169 -0.295  
 
-0.006 -0.098**  
 
(1.42) (-0.90)  
 
(-0.31) (-2.12)  
Stock Market Cap/GDP -0.045 0.025  
 
0.031 -0.014  
 
(-0.67) (0.28)  
 
(1.60) (-0.85)  
Constant 10.786*** -0.109  
 
0.052 -0.055***  
  (9.95) (-1.57)    (0.29) (-5.68)  
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  
 
Yes Yes  
Number of country clusters 25 25   25 25  
Number of observations 181 181  
 
181 181  




Insider Ownership and the Association between Insider Trading Restriction and Executive 
Compensation 
This table presents results of Tobit regressions of Ln(Equity Incentives) and OLS regressions of Ln(Total 
Pay) on insider trading restrictions measures, an indicator that percentage insider ownership is greater 
than the country-year median (HighInsOwn), their interactions, and the same set of firm and country 
control variables as in Table 2 (the coefficients of the control variables are omitted for brevity). The 
regressions in columns 1, 2, 5, 6 present regression results at the executive level for the subsample of 
firms with U.S. style reporting. Columns 3 and 4 are conducted at the firm level for the full sample of 
ADR firms with U.S. firms. All variable definitions can be found in Appendix A. 2-digit SIC industry 
fixed effects are included in all regressions. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by 
country and robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients. 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Equity Incentives)   Ln(Total Pay) 
 




Executive level, US style 
reporting 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Insider Trading Restrictions 
Measure: 


















































HighInsOwn 4.571** 8.290*** 
 




(4.24) (1.71) (3.78) (8.59) 
Other incentives: 
       Ln(Equity incentives) 
     
0.065*** 0.064*** 
 
     
(11.22) (10.30) 
Firm and country controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Executive Controls Yes Yes 
 
No No Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of country clusters 15 14   38 31 15 14 
Number of observations 1,679 1,674 
 
1,047 1,013 1,657 1,652 





Changes in Inside Ownership following Initial Enforcement of Insider Trading Laws 
The dependent variable is the closely-held ownership, defined as closely-held shares as a percentage of 
the total shares outstanding. ‘High Prior Ownership’ is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the 
firm’s pre-enforcement closely-held ownership is above the median and zero otherwise.  Industry fixed 
effects are at the 2-digit SIC level. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by country and robust to 
heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 













  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 












      
-11.400** -8.919** 
    *High Prior Ownership 
      
(-2.56) (-2.82) 
High Prior Ownership 
      
38.967*** 33.375*** 
       
(23.34) (21.44) 



























































































































Target Firm Stock Price Run-ups before Takeover Announcements 
The dependent variable is “one month price run-up”, defined as the ratio of the cumulative abnormal 
stock return of the target firm in the 1 month prior to the takeover announcement and the cumulative 
abnormal stock return from 1 month prior to announcement through 1 day after the announcement. 
Abnormal stock return is defined as the difference in the stock return of a target firm and the return of its 
local stock market index during the same day. IT Enforce is an indicator for the year of and years 
following the initial enforcement of insider trading laws.  Column 3 excludes countries with more than 
100 observations in the sample. The country control variables in regressions 1-4 come from Djankov et al. 
(2008) while GDP per capita in regression 5 comes from World Bank and is measured yearly. All other 
variable definitions can be found in Appendix A. All regressions include year fixed-effects and industry 
fixed-effects at the 2-digit SIC level except in column 3, which includes industry fixed effects at the 1-
digit SIC level. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by country and robust to 
heteroskedasticity are reported in the parentheses below the estimated coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate 
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 ITL index 
 
-0.102** 
   
  
(-2.75) 
   IT Enforce 
    
-0.180* 
     
(-1.74) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.111 -0.007 0.060 0.443** 0.145 
 
(1.17) (-0.06) (0.49) (2.62) (0.13) 
Stock Market Cap/GDP -0.035 -0.022 -0.048** -0.015 
 
 
(-1.35) (-0.79) (-2.35) (-0.42) 
 Anti-director index 0.052** 0.022 0.007 0.134*** 
 
 
(2.69) (1.07) (0.17) (4.30) 
 Ln(Deal value) 0.018** 0.018* 0.017 0.016 0.020** 
 
(2.07) (2.01) (0.69) (0.90) (2.43) 
Stock bid 0.053*** 0.054*** -0.021 0.090 0.049** 
 
(2.84) (2.91) (-0.22) (1.54) (2.66) 
Hostile -0.185*** -0.185*** 0.232 -0.085 -0.204*** 
 
(-5.32) (-5.31) (0.88) (-1.03) (-6.67) 
Unsolicited 0.103** 0.106** -0.381* 0.013 0.110** 
 
(2.20) (2.29) (-1.85) (0.15) (2.42) 










Number of country clusters 31 28 27 25 31 
Number of observations 3,007 3,003 382 1,396 3,007 
R2 0.033 0.033 0.085 0.051 0.039 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Executive compensation variables 
Total Pay = salary + bonus + other annual (including perquisites and severance pay) + other 
compensation (primarily pension) + restricted stock awards (value at time of award) + option grants 
(Black-Scholes value at time of grant). Total Pay is in U.S. Dollars. Ln(Total Pay) is the natural logarithm 
of Total Pay.  
Equity Pay Ratio = (restricted stock awards + option grants) / Total Pay 
Equity Incentives is the change in the value of executive share ownership as reported when the stock 
price changes by 1%. The reported share ownership is based on fully diluted shares, i.e., assuming all 
options outstanding are exercised. 
Note: In many analyses in the paper, firm-level pay variables are used. To construct the firm-level pay 
variables, we follow the algorithm detailed below: 
When data is available at the executive level, a firm-level compensation variable is the equally-weighted 
average of the executive-level variable for the top five highest-paid executives or all executives with 
available compensation data (if there are fewer than five executives with available data).  
When only firm-level aggregate data is available, firm-level compensation variables are derived from the 
aggregate data. Firm-level Total Pay is the firm aggregate compensation, divided by the number of 
executives (and directors) included in the aggregate compensation figure. Firm-level Equity Pay Ratio is 
the ratio of aggregate stock and option awards to total pay. 
Insider trading restriction variables 
ITR Index is the Insider Trading Restriction Index obtained from the 1996, 1998 and 1999 Global 
Competitiveness Report based on the following question: “Insider trading is not common in the domestic 
market (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)”. 
ITL Index is drawn from Beny (2004, 2006) and is the sum of three binary variables summarizing insider 
trading laws in place in 36 countries as of 1994, namely, Tippee, Tipping, and Criminal. Tippee equals 1 
if tippees (i.e., a corporate outsider receiving inside information from an insider) are subject to insider 
trading regulation and 0 otherwise.  Tipping equals 1 if an insider can be held liable for tipping outsiders 
and 0 otherwise.  Criminal is 1 if violation of the insider trading law is a criminal offense and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables 
Ln(Asset) is the logarithm of the total book value of assets. Asset is in millions of US Dollars. 
M/B is the ratio of the market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) over the 
book value of assets. 
D/A is the ratio of the book value of debt (long-term debt plus debt in short-term liabilities) over the book 
value of assets. 
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ROA is the ratio of operating income before depreciation and amortization over the book value of assets, 
lagged by one year.  
Stock return is the annual stock return including dividends, lagged by one year. 
Board size is the number of board of directors. Source: 20-F reports. 
Board independence is the fraction of independent directors on the board. Both board size and board 
independence variables are collected from the 20-F filings. Following the Riskmetrics’ (formerly IRRC’s) 
definition, an independent director is someone who is not an officer or a former officer, who does not 
provide (or does not work for an employer that provides) professional services to the company, and who 
is not a major customer, or family member of a director or executive. Source: 20-F reports. 
Insider ownership is the share ownership by executives, including both their direct ownership in the firm 
and indirect ownership through their close relatives or another company as revealed in the 20-F filing. 
When used in firm level tests, it is total ownership by all officers and directors. 
Indicator that total pay includes directors: A dummy variable that is 0 if firm aggregate pay only 
includes executive officers (regardless of whether she is on the board), and is 1 if it includes both 
executive officers and non-executive directors.  
CEO is a dummy variable that is 1 if the executive is the Chief Executive Officer.  
Age is the age of the executive.  
Ln(GDP per capita) is the Logarithmic of per capita Gross Domestic Product (in U.S. dollars). Source: 
World Development Indicators by the World Bank  
Stock Market Cap/GDP is the Average of the ratio of stock market capitalization to gross domestic 
product. Source: World Development Indicators by the World Bank. 
Anti-director Index is the Revised Anti-director Index from Djankov, La Porta, and Lopez-de-Silanes 
(2008). Available for 72 countries, this index is constructed based on laws and regulations applicable to 
publicly traded firms in May 2003, and summarizes the protection of minority shareholders in the 
corporate decision-making process.  
Additional variables used in panel datasets 
Incentive Pay Measure (IPM) is the mean score of the responses to the following survey questions in the 
Global Competitiveness Reports. “Non-wage incentives (such as profit sharing and stock purchase plans) 
are used effectively to motivate employees (1=strongly disagree, 6=strongly agree)” (1996). 
“Compensation policies link pay closely with job performance (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)” 
(1998 and 1999). 
Total Pay is Total Remuneration for CEO in U.S. Dollars, converted to 1982-1984 real terms. Source: 
Worldwide Total Remuneration reports by Towers Perrin. 
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Equity Pay Ratio is the fraction of Long-term Incentives in Total Remuneration. Long-term Incentives 
capture the annual expected value of stock options, stock grants and other long-term incentive awards. 
Source: Worldwide Total Remuneration reports by Towers Perrin. 
IT Enforce is an indicator for the year of and years following the initial enforcement of insider trading 
laws. Source: Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). 
Variables used in takeover price run-up tests 
Ln(Deal value) is the natural logarithm of the transaction value of the takeover in $mil. 
Stock bid is an indicator that is 1 if the method of payment of the takeover contains stock and 0 
otherwise. 
Hostile is an indicator that is 1 if the takeover is identified as “Hostile” in SDC. 
Unsolicited is an indicator that is 1 if the bid is identified as “Unsolicited” by managers in SDC.  
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Appendix B: ITR indexes in 1996-1999 
Country 
ITR index  
96 




Argentina 3.21 4.05 3.88 
Australia 5.04 5.27 5.59 
Austria 4.5 4.8 4.83 
Belgium 4.36 5 5.41 
Bolivia . . 3.86 
Brazil 3.14 3.8 3.72 
Bulgaria . . 3.47 
Canada 4.45 5.03 5.55 
Chile 4.56 4.56 4.16 
China 3.47 3.31 3.45 
Colombia 3.36 3.97 3.42 
Costa Rica . . 3.87 
Czech Republic 2.9 2.86 2.9 
Denmark 5.27 5.79 6 
Ecuador . . 3.5 
Egypt 3.42 3.81 3.77 
El Salvador . . 3.7 
Finland 4.58 5.26 5.53 
France 3.87 4.69 5.17 
Germany 4.35 5.8 5.24 
Greece 3.46 3.5 3.41 
Hong Kong 4.17 4.32 3.94 
Hungary 3.36 4.04 3.81 
Iceland 3.89 4.53 4 
India 2.49 3.42 3.53 
Indonesia 2.82 3.33 3.56 
Ireland 4.4 5.58 5.19 
Israel 3.48 4.08 4.39 
Italy 2.92 3.88 4.38 
Japan 4.85 5.05 5.26 
Jordan 3.37 3.58 3.78 
South Korea 3.81 3.73 4.1 
Luxembourg 5.5 5.5 6.22 
Malaysia 3.69 3.65 3.42 
Mauritius . . 3.68 
Mexico 3.14 3.49 3.54 
Netherlands 4.63 4.62 5.2 
New Zealand 5.3 5.52 5.4 
Norway 4.08 4.67 4.24 
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Peru 3.61 3.79 3.99 
Philippines 2.79 3.32 3.48 
Poland 3.46 4.48 3.88 
Portugal 3.71 4.52 4.37 
Russia 2.35 3.36 3.38 
Singapore 5.1 5.54 5.58 
Slovakia . 3.25 3.47 
South Africa 3.76 3.87 3.74 
Spain 3.64 4.42 4.68 
Sweden 4.35 5.48 5.58 
Switzerland 4.8 5.3 4.67 
Taiwan 3.1 3.42 3.18 
Thailand 4.24 3.25 3.29 
Turkey 3 4.26 3.58 
Ukraine . 3.9 4.56 
United Kingdom 4.47 5.64 5.85 
United States 4.63 5.13 5.64 
Venezuela 2.81 3.04 3.3 
Vietnam . 5.92 6.77 
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